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Abstract 
Existing work on land politics in Africa suggests that governments, by 
creating and upholding neocustomary land tenure regimes, create powerful 
incentives for individuals to embrace state-recognized ethnic identities. 
This paper strengthens this argument about the institutional determinants 
of ethnicity's high political salience through the use of contrasting 
evidence from Tanzania. In Tanzania, non-neocustomary land tenure 
institutions prevail, and the political salience of ethnic identity is low. 
Even in a hard-test region of high in-migration and high competition for 
farmland, the political salience of ethnic identity in land politics is low. 
The findings suggest that political science needs to take seriously the role 
of state institutions in producing politically-salient ethnic identities in 
Africa.   
 
 
 
In comparative politics analysis, the African state often appears as the archetype 
of the patrimonial political form. It is depicted as animated by informal logics and fluid, 
personalized patronage networks that barely penetrate the rural areas. Institutional 
determinants of political outcomes are assumed to be exceeding weak, and ideational and 
behavioral factors assume great weight in political explanations.  Ethnicity in particular, 
taken as an ideational force that is exogenous to the state, is taken to be a powerful cause 
of a wide range of political outcomes, including low public goods provision, corruption, 
state weakness, and civil conflict.i  This paper challenges this model of African politics 
by presenting new evidence of the powerful role of state institutions in producing 
politically-salient forms of ethnicity in rural Africa. It follows on the work of Daniel 
Posner (2005), who broke with non-institutional approaches by showing that electoral 
institutions can shape which ethnic identity is activated in mobilizing voters.ii This paper 
goes considerably further than that, presenting evidence that suggests that in rural Africa, 
property institutions go far in determining whether ethnic identity has political salience at 
all.  
The analysis focuses on rural property regimes in land.  These are institutional 
configurations that vary across countries as well as across subnational regions within 
countries, and that are actively molded and enforced by African states.  In most of Africa, 
rural property regimes are "neocustomary" in nature. The "customary" refers to the ethnic 
entitlements to land that these property regimes embody and convey, as well as to the 
place they grant to "customary" leaders in land rights adjudication and enforcement.  
"Neo" underscores the extent to which pre-colonial land tenure practices and authority 
structures were remolded under colonial indirect rule, and then modified by postcolonial 
governments in ways that reproduced their neocustomary character.  About 80-90% of all 
farmland in most African countries is held under some type of neocustomary tenure.  
Most governments recognize neocustomary land rights and administer neocustomary 
tenure regimes at least partly through the intermediation of neocustomary leaders such as 
chiefs.  Landholdings held under this form of tenure are not surveyed, registered, or 
titled.iii 
Large literatures in history and economic anthropology have argued that 
neocustomary land tenure regimes in Africa create economically- and politically-salient 
ethnic identities, and uphold local political intermediaries such as chiefs as community 
representatives in the eyes of the state.iv  From a broadly comparative perspective, this 
argument should not be surprising:  property institutions that allocate access to natural 
resources on the basis of membership in ethnic communities have been shown to produce 
identity-activating or identity-enhancing effects in other parts of the world, including on 
Native American (Indian) reservations in the United States and in "indigenous territories" 
in Latin American countries.v  More generally, government institutions and policies that 
allocate goods on the basis of ascriptive identities often play a strong role in creating, 
shaping, and valorizing such identities, and in catalyzing the formation of social groups 
defined in terms of these indentities.vi   
In spite of the African and comparative evidence, arguments about the ethnicity-
producing effects of neocustomary land institutions in Africa have not had much of an 
impact on literature in political science.  Most of this work takes ethnicity in Africa as a 
behaviorial variable that operates independently of (is exogenous to), and acts upon, state 
structure.  This may be because arguments about the institutional causes of political 
ethnicity have not been "put to the test" through the use of contrasting and counterfactual 
evidence. The effects of neocustomary tenure have not been compared to the effects of 
other forms of rural land tenure in Africa.   
This paper aims to remedy this deficiency. It uses qualitative political evidence 
from rural districts of Tanzania, where the postcolonial state has dismantled 
neocustomary land tenure institutions and replaced them with a "direct rule" or "statist" 
from of land tenure. This creates settings in which is it possible to use comparative logic 
and counterfactual reasoning to preliminarily "test" arguments about the political effects 
of statist land institutions.  
Part I follows Mahmood Mamdani and others in differentiating neocustomary and 
statist land institutions as distinct ideal-types, and specifying their expected political 
effects. We concentrate on two effects in particular. The first is an ethnic effect, or the 
production (or not) of politically-salient ethnicity.  The second is a political-meditation 
effect, or the presence (or absence) of a layer of neocustomary intermediaries who 
impede rural citizens' access to national political institutions.  Part II traces the 
dismantling of Tanganika's neocustomary land institutions and the construction of statist 
land institutions.  Part III presents evidence of statist institutional cause and political 
effect Tanzania's Manyara Region. Part IV summarizes and extends the results.  Part V 
considers two possibly non-conforming situations.  
The analysis provides support for the argument that Tanzania's distinctly statist 
land tenure institutions produce two distinct political effects.  First, they devalue ethnicity 
as a political and economic identity because the institutional rules provide no incentives 
for overt political discourse that justifies claims to agricultural land in ethnic terms.  
Second, the statist land institutions give rural citizens direct channels of access to national 
judicial and electoral institutions. Neotraditional authorities are not imposed as 
intermediaries between rural citizens and the state. The conclusion draws out implications 
for institutional analysis in Africa, for explaining national identity in Tanzania, and for 
studies of ethnicity.  
 
I. Different types of land institutions and their political effects 
 There is a large literature on land tenure institutions in rural Africa, most of it 
focusing on the origins and effects of the so-called neocustomary land regimes.  These 
were institutionalized as the foundation of colonial indirect rule and were upheld by 
postcolonial states (in modified forms) in much, perhaps most, of independent Africa. 
Mamdani, Mathieu, Roe, and others draw a clear distinction neocustomary regimes and 
non-neocustomary or "statist" land tenure regimes.vii  
 In Citizen and Subject, Mahmood Mamdani offers the most stylized and 
explicitly-theorized contrast between the types of land institutions. He writes that the 
neocustomary type of land tenure institutions created colonial subjects "stamped with an 
ethnic identity and ruled by chiefs ['decentralized despots']."  The neocustomary 
institutions produce an ethnic effect, which is tribalization, and a scale effect, which is 
indirect rule and "enclosure" of the tribalized subject in the local political and legal arena.  
By contrast, the statist or state-administered land institutions created the prototype of "a 
detribalized Africa ruled directly via the centralized despotism of the [colonial and] 
postcolonial state."viii  The ethnic effect of the statist institutions is detribalization, and the 
scale effect is direct rule by the central state.  Rather than "bottling things up" in the 
neocustomary, the statist institutions place the land user in a direct relationship with the 
state.  
 
(a.) The neocustomary regimes.   Economic anthropologists and land-use scholars offer a 
great deal of evidence in support of Mamdani's argument about the political effects of 
neocustomary institutions.  
 Neocustomary land tenure regimes assign land-access and land-use rights to 
classes of users based on their ethnic status.ix  They rest on a basic distinction between 
two categories of land-users -- "natives " and "non-natives" of a given ethnic homeland. 
Native status (ie., membership in the officially-recognized ethnic group) provides an 
entitlement to claim land in the ethnic homeland as a birthright.  Non-natives have 
second-class status and must negotiate permissive occupancy and land-use with the 
ethnic "landlords."  As Stephano Boni explained, classifying each farmers’ ethnic 
membership is necessary for the implementation of the tenurial and taxation regime.x  
Across different parts of Africa, ethnic outsiders or in-migrants referred to in local and 
official parlance as strangers, allogènes or alloctones, newcomers, guests, tenants, or 
internal foreigners.  
 Governments enforce and reproduce these status designations by creating and 
recognizing ethnic jurisdictions, and the neocustomary land rules that govern inheritance, 
land transactions, and labor relations within these jurisdictions.  Most appoint, confirm 
and/or pay neotraditional authorities to act as intermediaries between state agents and 
local people in land matters (and many other routine administrative matters).  
 Such rules valorize ethnic-insider status through everyday land-holding rules and 
practices.  They incentivize land users to claim ethnic identities as they seek to gain or 
retain land in their ethnic homelands. Prima facie evidence can be found in zones of 
rising land scarcity: as land grows scarce in one's ethnic homeland, the value and salience 
of ethnic indigeneity often rises.  In regions of high in-migration, neocustomary 
institutions work to structure competition for land along along the ethnic-insider/ethnic-
outsider lines.xi 
 At the same time, neocustomary institutions empower state-recognized chiefs or 
elders in land affairs, and authorize them to act intermediaries between members of rural 
communities and the state.  Mamdani theorized this decentralized despotism that 
"containerized" or "enclosed" the rural subject in the local world of the neocustomary. In 
land politics, neocustomary institutions are designed to produce a localizing effect, 
limiting possibilities for "exporting" cases outside of the local judicial arena. Studies of 
land dispute adjudication under neocustomary land tenure regimes in places like central 
Ghana and northern Cameroon in the 2000s confirm that this abstract model goes far in 
describing lived reality of land users.xii  
 
(b.) Statist land tenure regimes.   Statist land tenure regimes reject (or do not recognize) 
the principle of ethnic-based land allocation, and are not embedded in state-recognized 
ethnic homelands in which neocustomary authorities act as local land allocators or 
adjudicators.  Herein lies their specificity.  Under these land institutions, the central state 
itself, via its direct agents, makes land allocations directly to land-users.  Secular (de-
ethnicized) mechanisms of land dispute adjudication prevail.  
 Rural territories under statist land institutions exist in some subnational regions of 
most African countries -- they exist where governments do not recognize neocustomary 
authority and neocustomary land entitlements.  Prime examples are urban areas, game 
parks, forest reserves, farmland that has been nationalized and is administered directly by 
state agents (Office du Niger, Senegal River Delta), and settlement scheme areas such as 
the farming districts of the Rift Valley in Kenya. 
 Following Mamdani's reasoning, the absence of neocustomary institutions should 
produce two effects.  First, because statist land tenure regimes do not allocate on the basis 
of ethnicity or recognize ethnicity-based claims, the salience of ethnicity in routine land 
administration and dispute adjudication is expected to be low. Statist land tenure regimes 
should promote the coalescing of individual and group identities along non-ethnic lines 
(for example, as class, livelihood, or national identities).  Second, because of the 
government's direct role in land allocation, administration, and enforcement, relations 
between land users and the state are direct, rather than mediated through neocustomary 
brokers.  Direct linkage should be visible in the presence of institutional channels by 
which land-related conflict can “scale up” through a hierarchy of national judicial and 
electoral institutions.   
 
(c.) Testing these arguments in Tanzania 
  Arguments about neocustomary land institutions and their political effects have 
been developed extensively in Africa-focused literatures on land and the production of 
ethnic identities.  Until now, however, they have not been put to the test by comparing 
the effects of neocustomary and non-neocustomary rural land institutions.  In the absence 
of "variation on the independent variable," it can be difficult to distinguish institutional 
effects from the effects of other causes, such as ideological or cultural preferences. This 
paper strengthens the institutional argument by providing evidence of the contrasting 
case. 
 Postcolonial Tanzania is an important case because its government has built a 
unified system of statist land institutions that administer land across all subnational 
regions of the country.xiii  Customary authorities do not have state-recognized authority in 
land administration and adjudication, and the postcolonial state has not institutionalized 
ethnic homelands for agriculturalists.xiv  We can turn to Tanzania to see if statist land 
institutions produce the expected political effects.   
 
II. Development of a Statist Land Tenure Regime in Tanzania 
 Tanzania stands out as a rare example of a statist land tenure regime that has been 
imposed and implemented throughout the national space. Today's land institutions 
developed over time in seven key phases, or steps. 
 The first phase was the period of colonial indirect rule in Tanganika.  Ultimate 
ownership of all non-registered land was vested in the colonial governor, as in many 
African colonies.  The institutional infrastructure of indirect rule was erected throughout 
most of the territory.  Chiefs were appointed to govern ethnic territories. Yet because of 
Tanganika's status as a League of Nations mandate territory, indirect rule in this case had 
some distinctive features.  Mostly importantly, the unusual 1923 land law (and 1928 
amendment) recognized customary rights of occupancy (deemed or permissive rights) in 
established farming areas, and invested these rights in the land user, not the ethnic 
group.xv  The land user gained a customary or deemed right to land after 12 years of 
undisturbed use. With national independence, the ownership rights of the colonial 
governor were transferred to the President of the republic, and the 1923 (1928) land law 
was carried forward, unaltered. 
 Second, in the wake of independence, the government replaced most rural chiefs 
with direct state agents. In Ugogo (near Dodoma), for example, "when political chiefship 
was abolished in 1962, ... together with the sub-chiefs and village headmen, their secular 
functions were transferred to the new village executive officers, divisional executive 
officers, village development committees, and related offices."xvi Replacement of indirect 
rule's agents with direct agents of the central state strengthened the hand of central 
authorities at the local level, including their hold on land administration. 
 Third was the 1967 Arusha Declaration.  It nationalized most privately-owned 
properties, including most of the approximately 2% of Tanzania's land surface that was 
alienated to Europeans and other foreigners under colonial rule.  The state asserted direct 
control over these lands. 
 Fourth was the Ujamaa period of forced resettlement and the expropriation of 
African-held large landholdings in the mid-1970s.xvii  Ujamaa resettlement cut against 
customary rights as hitherto defined in Tanzanian law, as villages were reconfigured, 
people were relocated into some 8,000 new villages, and smallholders were allotted new 
plots for farming. All told, about half the rural population was actually moved. This 
process also entailed the creation of new, local-level political structures: "These 
reformulated community institutions were to be supervised by a parallel system of 
governmental and party bureaucrats, thus effectively eliminating community leaders 
affiliated with the old colonial system.  Land was henceforth available only from party-
supervised village councils."xviii Donald Williams described this as "a vast administrative 
apparatus set up to displace lineage and neighborhood institutions..."xix Mascarenhas 
wrote than "villagization removed the last vestiges of 'tribal security."xx  Villagization 
also eroded the principle of ethnic homelands by altering settlement patterns and opening 
local lands to "arbitrary encroachment, invasion, and alienation in favor of outside 
individuals and institutions (including government) against the interests and wishes of 
villagers."xxi  Many new villages were culturally and linguistically heterogeneous.  
 A fifth juncture was the "roll back of socialism" in the mid-1980s. Some African 
landholders whose property had been expropriated at the height of Ujamaa sought land 
restitution, but almost all of these cases were beaten back in court.  In 1992, the 
government passed the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act which, as 
Mbunda writes, "extinguished customary rights with respect to village land, which are 
lands within the jurisdictional area of villages previously established during the ... 
villagization programs of 1973-76.  It also took away the right of compensation, and 
precluded civil suits or claims to assert any such right, terminated the many pending 
cases, and prohibited the execution of any judgment relating to the same."xxii  
 This set the stage for the sixth period, the Land Act period, defined by the 1995 
National Land Policy, the 1999 Land Act, and the 1999 Village Land Act.xxiii  The 1999 
Village Land Act provided a legal standing for deemed or granted rights of occupancy 
allocated by the state under Ujamaa. The Acts made secular, decentralized local 
governments the allocators of village lands that are not assigned to individuals. Villages 
were recognized as local-level territorial jurisdictions (some are jurisdictions of 100 sq. 
kms) and administrative units.  The 1999 Land Acts also created a hierarchy of formal 
land tribunals, running from newly-created village land barazas, to new ward land 
tribunals, to district level land and housing courts, and the national level high court for 
land in Arusha (with the possibility of appeal to the supreme court in Dar es Salaam). All 
levels of the juridical hierarchy were linked via the appeal mechanism.   
 The seventh period is the neo-liberal, pro-investment period.  Legal arrangements 
set in place over the course of most of a century have facilitated commercial land 
transactions and the alienation of village lands to investors.  Individuals can now rent or 
lease registered allotments under the Land (Amendment) Act of 2004.  Salme Maoulidi 
(n.d.) of Tanzania's Hakiardhi Institute sees this measure as fully commoditizing land.xxiv 
 The centralizing, legalistic, and bureaucratizing features of Tanzania's land laws 
have been targets of critique by Tanzanian academics and public intellectuals. Chris Peter 
argues that building the legal machinery for land adjudication in the 1990s and 2000s 
produced a "judicialization of [land] conflict" whereby social and political problems are 
turned into legal problems.xxv  Local political actors must conform to legal convention if 
they are to be "heard" by the state, thus reinforcing state authority.  Issa Shivji worried 
that Tanzania had created a bureaucratic-authoritarian form of land administration.xxvi    
 If statist land institutions "detribalize rural power" and establish "direct rule" 
connections between land users and the state in the ways foreseen by Mamdani, then this 
should be visible in Tanzania. 
 
III. Six Manyara Cases: Statist Land Institutions and Their Political Effects 
 Our research in the western districts of Manyara Region, Tanzania, provides 
empirical support for this argument about the political effects of non-neocustomary (ie., 
statist) land tenure institutions. Research design principles guided this regional focus and 
case selection therein. The western part of Manyara is a region of relatively high 
population density, historically good rainfall levels, good soil fertility, and high levels of 
commercialization of agriculture, mostly on family farms. There are high levels of in-
migration and widespread perceptions of land scarcity.  The social and economic 
pressures that find expression in "sons of the soil" ethnic conflicts in other parts of Africa 
are present.  However, because of institutional factors (ie., presence of de-ethnicized land 
tenure institutions), we expect this form of conflict to be absent. And in a region where 
land-related tensions run high, there are many opportunities to observe the scale at which 
land dispute adjudication plays out. We expect some land cases to scale up through the 
national judicial and electoral system (to be "exported" out of local arena).  This is 
because Tanzanian land institutions do not empower neotraditional intermediaries to 
"bottle up conflict" at the local level.  
 Figure 1 locates the six cases on a map of Manyara Region's western districts.  
Table I introduces the cases by key attributes.  The table's top two rows show that all six 
are zones of high land pressure; five are zones of in-migration.  The middle two rows 
indicate which cases have a history of colonial indirect rule and thus, a history of state-
recognized ethnic land claims.  Historical memories of state-recognized ethnic land 
claims make these localities an especially hard test of the hypothesis that statist land 
institutions extinguish incentives for advancing ethnic land claims. The penultimate row 
codes for the presence of elders with some historical authority in land matters. If disputes 
scale up in localities even where 'traditional elders' are alive and well, then the scaling up 
hypothesis has passed a hard test.  The last row indicates whether we are looking at a 
pastoralist zone or not.  The significance of this variable is discussed in Part V. 
  
Figure 1: Northern Tanzania Study Zones 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 1: Western Manyara Region Cases: Key Attributes 
 
 
 
 
 Information was gathered from the secondary literature, the Tanzania National 
Archives, and fieldwork in 2011-2013.  Village and ward-level data came from ward 
executive offices and ward land tribunal chairpersons and secretaries; Babati district 
officials; agricultural, forest, and livestock officers in each district; and farmers in each 
study area, for a total of about 50 interviews (in Swahili and English).  
 
i.)   Kiru Valley, Babati District  
 The Kiru Valley is a well-irrigated, fertile valley in the Babati District of Manyara 
Region.  A statist land tenure regime prevails without any traces of (ancestral) or 
customary claims by settled agriculturalists.xxvii There is no institutionalized customary 
 
 
Table 1: Western Manyara Region Cases: Key Attributes 
cases i. Kiru 
Valley 
ii. Mamire iii. Riroda 
and 
Ayasanda 
iv. Hanang, E.  
(Giting) 
v. Hanang, W. 
(Bassotu) 
vi. Mbulu: 
Murray  
and Nambis 
(Iraqw Da'aw) 
district Babati Babati Babati Hanang Hanang Mbulu 
high pressure on the 
land? 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
high in-migration? yes yes yes yes yes no 
residual neo-customary 
core, or memory of 
ethnic land claims? 
no no yes    ? yes yes 
part of colonial ethnic 
territory? 
excised from 
Gorowa area 
periphery 
of Gorowa 
NA 
core of ex-
Gorowa NA 
Mbulu 
"expansion 
area" 
Mbulu 
"expansion 
area" 
core of Iraqw 
NA 
presence of elders who 
may claim some political 
authority over land 
no no yes?  no yes? yes 
pastoralist  
jursidiction 
no no no no yes no 
 
authority.  Until the 1940s, the Kiru Valley was tse-tse infested and inhabited by a small 
community of hunter-gathers (the Mbugwe) in its northernmost reaches. The colonial 
government made large-scale land concessions to European settlers.xxviii  With tse-tse 
eradication in the late 1940s, the process took-off, and most land in the Kiru Valley was 
owned by white settlers at the time of independence. Tanzanians in-migrated from many 
parts of northern and central Tanzania to provide farm labor. They were often allowed to 
farm small plots of a few acres on their own account, much like the African workers in 
Kenya's so-called White Highlands.   
 These large landholdings were expropriated under the 1967 Arusha Declaration.  
Most of the land was then leased by the Tanzania government as large NAFCO (National 
Food Corporation) concessions to foreign companies. After the economic failure of these 
ventures and the turn to privatization policies in the 1990s, the government leased these 
same properties to new investors.  This time, most investors were Tanzanian citizens of 
Asian descent.  There were strenuous objections from members of the culturally-
heterogeneous communities of African farmers who were, by now, long-established in 
the Kiru Valley, some as squatters of properties abandoned by Europeans and/or 
NAFCO.  
 The government's decision to lease land to the Tanzanian citizens of Asian 
descent for the creation of sugar plantations, and the eviction of many squatters that has 
resulted, has been bitterly contested by small-scale farmers in the Kiru Valley, who are 
experiencing acute land shortage.  As their families have expanded, the land available to 
them has shrunk. Today's large landowners combat encroachment by smallholders and 
their livestock, sometimes using force to evict them and to enclose their plantations.   
Small farmers, workers, and the landless have attacked the investors and vandalized their 
properties, burning sugar plantations and killing farm owners and managers in the early 
1990s, mid-1990s, and in 2011. Through violence, protests, civil disobedience, and the 
multiparty system, they continue to demand that the government terminate the 
commercial leases and allocate land to them.  The state backs the investors but has not 
responded forcefully to repress violence and threats against the investors, or to prevent 
encroachment on the plantations.  
 In the absence of institutions for the creation or affirmation of neocustomary 
(ethnic) rights, land-related conflict in this setting is not expressed as ethnic conflict.  
Rather, it has taken the form of politicized land-related violence pitting "indigenous 
Tanzanians" against "outside investors" (who are non-indigenous Tanzanian citizens).  
 The conflict scaled up through national-level electoral and judicial institutions. 
Local politicians did missed the chance for electoral gain.  An opposition-party 
(Chadema) candidate for a Babati District seat in the national legislature sought to 
represent those who are demanding that the government turn over some of the large 
holdings to land-poor and landless peasants. A Kiru Valley landowner reported that "All 
the people in Kiru Valley voted for Chadema in the [2010] elections. The Chadema 
candidate campaigned on the promise that the land would be returned to the people."xxix  
The government, for its part, sent several MPs, including the Speaker of Parliament, to 
Kiru Valley in 2010.  It "promised to resolve the conflict,  but it has not done so."xxx For 
the most part the government seeks to lay low:  in summer 2011 it stationed extra 
policemen in the Kiru Valley, but declined to pursue aggressively or prosecute the local 
villagers who are accused of farm burnings and of the sensational murder in 2011 of a 
sugar estate manager.   
 Smallholders and large landholders use the national court system intensively, as 
indicated by the large number of cases that are processed through the formal land 
tribunals (Table 1).  Two Kiru Valley land cases have reached the High Court at Arusha. 
 
ii.) Mamire Ward, Babati District 
 Mamire is a ward in which almost everyone is a post-1950 in-migrant, and in 
which agriculturalists have no ancestral land claims.xxxi  This jurisdiction lies on the hills 
on the eastern side of the Kiru Valley.  Under British rule it was part of the Gorowa 
Native Authority, the core of which lay near the end of Lake Babati. The territory was 
very sparely inhabited until aggressive tse-tse clearing campaigns of the late 1940s and 
1950s. Starting in the 1940s and 1950s, other land-seekers from Central Tanzania also 
came to these areas to settle, some more or less spontaneously and some through land 
purchases from the Gorowa Native Authority.  In the 1966 "Operation Mbugwe," the 
Tanzanian government resettled the Mbugwe, who were viewed by both the colonial and 
post-colonial administrations as non-industrious and "bad cultivators," to lands to the east 
of the Kiru Valley that were now open to settlement.xxxii  
 Settlement patterns in Mamire and the other jurisdictions in eastern Babati 
District were completely reorganized under Ujamaa. Farmers were moved from their 
homes and properties and relocated to administrative villages. They received new land 
allocations in these village jurisdictions. Some continued to commute to their old farms 
and mosques. In the immediate post-Ujamaa period, there were some rumblings of 
demands to recover lands lost in the Ujamaa expropriations/resettlement, but these were 
definitively squelched by the state in 1992, as noted above. This extinguished pre-Ujamaa 
claims to farmland in Mamire and throughout the eastern Babati wards (which had not 
been based on ancestral rights or indigeneity in the first place).  All land in the village 
jurisdiction of Mamire has now been allocated -- no open land remains -- and those in 
need of land can out-migrate, rent land, or work on the holdings of others.  
 Routine land administration in these "administrative (government-created) 
villages" happens via the formal, secular system. The elected Ward Land Tribunal 
handles a wide variety of mundane and low-level cases. "Now, everything having to do 
with land is in the courts."xxxiii  Many cases are processed through the formal courts 
(Table 1).  A Mamire Ward Land Tribunal staff person reported that 80% of the cases are 
resolved at the Ward level.xxxiv Appeals go to the District Land and Housing Tribunal in 
Babati.   
 This is a region that is fully multi-cultural and in which ethnicity is not recognized 
as the basis of making claims to land.    
 
 iii. Riroda and Ayasanda, the ex-Gorowa Native Authority area 
 Within Babati District, two rural wards are considered "Gorowa native areas" and 
represent part of the core of the now defunct Gorowa Native Authority: Ayasanda and 
Riroada. This was a territory with a titular ethnic group with communal claims to 
territory, and that was represented by a state-recognized chief under colonial rule.  If 
there is anywhere in Babati where agriculturalists can claim to have ancestral claims to 
territory, it is here.   
 Today, the native Gorowa are outnumbered by in-migrants, many of whom 
arrived and received land allotments from the government under the Ujamaa programs in 
the 1970s.  The government has delimited parcels of all users and there are few conflicts 
over boundaries or ownership. There is a Gorowa communal consciousness, but as one 
member of the Riorda Land Tribunal said, "We Gorowa understand that the land belongs 
to the government.  If we want land, we go to the government.  There is no 'Gorowa 
land.'"xxxv  In 2012 conflict over the management of the former Gorowa native authority 
forest became politicized in Riroda ward in a local election that pitted the ruling party 
(Chama cha Mapinduzi, or CCM) candidate against an opposition (Chadema) candidate.  
The issue had to do with opening forest land to settlement, bu the dispute did not cut 
along a ethnic line.  This is an indicator of the secularization (de-ethnicization) of land 
management in this jurisdiction.  Interviewees reported the ward-level land courts in 
Riroda and Ayasanda were "not functioning," xxxvi  but that several disputes were in the 
district court.  Minor disputes were settled at the subvillage level without the involvement 
of Gorowa elders. 
 
iv.) Hanang District, eastern part: Giting Ward 
 Barabaig pastoralists were pushed out of this area in the early- to mid-1950s when 
the colonial administration decided to create a yeoman class of African commercial 
farmers on holdings about 500 ha. each in Giting, which lies at the well-watered foot of 
Mt. Hanang's northern side.xxxvii  Mechanized wheat farming became the centerpiece of 
the local economy.  The statist nature of the land regime in this jurisdiction was 
confirmed in 1967, when these properties were taken over by the state, and 1970s land 
reforms carried out under Ujamaa.  Giting's large holdings were broken up and 
redistributed in 4 acre plots to smallholders and landless residents, many of whom had in-
migrated to the Giting/Hanang area to work on the large wheat farms.   
 Vesa-Matti Loiske explains that when Ujamaa was abandoned, the former land 
owners sued the state to regain their properties.xxxviii   Although the lawsuits failed, the 
land administration system set up in this area in the 1990s, which devolved land 
adjudication to the village and ward levels, was quickly captured by the original large 
landholders. They used the prerogatives of the local court system to regain control over 
much of the land they had lost in the 1970s.  This has been contested by the smallholders 
in the courts, but they have not been successful in preventing the reconstitution of the old 
landholding elite.  Under the statist land tenure regime, these land conflicts have been 
played out through the national system of land administration institutions, and in 
confrontations between local residents and police. A large number of cases have made 
their way through the formal hierarchy of land tribunals.   
 The jurisdiction is culturally-heterogeneous, with the Iraqw constituting the 
majority in Giting. Loiske argues that land-related conflict has played out largely along 
class-like lines, with the leading families of the community, the wealthiest 25%, often at 
odds with the others.  There is not ethnic conflict over land in these wards.  
 
v. Hanang District, western part (Basotu) 
 In western Hanang District, on the former NAFCO lands, there is a bitter, long-
running conflict over the disposition of lands taken by the state from the Barabaig 
pastoralists for the creation of Canadian-run mechanized wheat farms in the 1970s. 
Through the courts and lobbying efforts, pastoralists now demand restitution of some of 
the ex-NAFCO lands that the central government has leased to the Hanang District 
Council.xxxix  They do so on the basis of livelihood claims, not ethnic claims, because as 
Hodgson concluded, this is the register in which their demands will be recognized by 
government.xl   
 Both the CCM as the government party and the Chadema opposition have sought 
political (electoral) gain in these disputes.xli As one Dar es Salaam observer put it, "this is 
a very hot issue that has allowed Chadema to get one of its first rural constituencies."xlii 
The Barabaig cause was championed by an appointed Chadema MP, Rose Kamili Slaa 
(wife of the party leader) who is from Basotu, the geographic epicenter of the 
Basotu/Mulbadaw conflict over the ex-NAFCO farms that has pit the Barabaig against 
the government. 
 
vi.) Mbulu District, Murray and Nambis Wards ("Iraqw Da'aw") 
 On the western side of the Rift Valley escarpment, overlooking Lake Manyara, is 
the part of Mbulu District considered to be the homeland of the Iraqw people (Iraqw 
Da'aw).  This fertile, well-watered, densely populated zone is one of the "islands of 
intensive agriculture in Eastern Africa" studied by Widgren and Sutton.xliii The Iraqw 
claim ancestral rights to the land.  Demographic pressure is very high, and rates of out-
migration have been high since the 1940s. xliv Now, with land pressure in the Iraqw 
"expansion areas" to the west and south, the only in-migration is the return flow of 
children and grandchildren who are asking their parents for access to farmland. There are 
no ethnic-outsiders in these wards. 
 Under Ujamaa, the government attempted to relocate local populations to 
administrative villages located along hill ridges, but farmers continued to cultivate their 
family holdings.xlv  People were not expelled from what they considered their traditional 
homeland area, and outsiders did not move in.  With the relaxation of the villagization 
policy in the late 1970s, many people moved back to their original homes. 
 Land-related conflict runs high in these localities.  Claims are not ethnicized: in 
these localities, everyone is considered an indigenous member of the traditional 
homeland. In adjudicating land conflict, clan elders whose positions were recognized by 
the colonial state as representing customary authority have some residual land-
adjudication authority.  Elders sit as elected members of the village and ward land 
barazas or tribunals. Yet even here, the secular and statist character of land institutions 
weighs heavily of land politics, and the statist institutions often trump the authority of 
elders. 
 Locals often resist the decisions of the Ward Land Tribunals.  Many cases scale 
up the formal hierarchy of land courts.  According to a Village Land Officer in Haylote 
(Murray Ward, 23 July 2011), only about 20% of the land-dispute cases that are heard at 
the Murray Ward Land Tribunal are resolved there.  Eighty percent of the cases are 
appealed up to the regional land court in Babati. As the Mbulu Land Officer explained it, 
"Everyone wants the top court only; they barely wait for the judgment of the Ward 
Tribunal."xlvi  
 Under the pressure of land scarcity, land-related tensions are manifest in land 
disputes within families and communities.  Yet as predicted, these conflicts are channeled 
into institutions that are local instances of national-scale land administration machinery, 
rather than bottled up at the local level.xlvii   
 
IV. Summary Overview: Ethnicity and Scale Effects of Statist Land Institutions 
 In the six local cases discussed above, the statist land tenure regime contributes to 
two effects.  First, open discussion and public discourse about land competition and 
conflict does not revolve around discussion of ethnic land rights, even in jurisdictions 
with very high levels of in-migration.  Land competition does not find political 
expression as ethnic conflict.  
 What we observed at the village and ward level was observed by the Nairobi-
based African Policy Institute (API) at the national level. The API (2009:10) wrote that 
land-related identity cleavages are 
clustered around the discourse of Uzawa (indigenous Tanzanians) versus the 'non-
wazawa" (usually Tanzanians of Asian origins) or Makaburu (whites or Boers, 
foreigners), and Moslems versus Christians...[E]specially in the rural areas, ethnic 
tensions revolve around the production of identifies such as farmers versus 
pastoralists, and wanachi (villagers) versus wawekezaji (investors).  There is also 
generational tension... and gendered tension where women are pitted against men 
in land ownership."  
 
 
 Afrobarometer national option polls also provide support for our findings 
regarding ethnicity.  Question 58 in the 2008 (Round 4) survey asked interviewees "who 
allocates land?" and offered "traditional leaders" as a response option.xlviii Across the 19 
regions of Tanzania, the response rate for "traditional leaders" ran from a low of 0.0 
percent (for Manyara and 12 other regions) to a high of 8.33 percent (for Kagera), with 
1.41 percent as the national average. Tanzania's national average response rate of 1.41 for 
"traditional leaders" was the second lowest (after Mozambique, which scored 0) for all 21 
African countries in the Afrobarometer survey. Ghana's score on this register was 66.4 
percent.xlix Afrobarometer survey data also reveal very low levels of politically salient 
ethnic identity across all regions of mainland Tanzania.  These results suggest that we 
are correct in classifying Tanzania's rural property regime as non-neocustomary (because 
of the non-role of chiefs in the land tenure regime), and that our findings regarding 
political ethnicity's low salience in Manyara Region land politics are (1) correct for 
Manyara, and (2) tap into a phenomenon that holds across Tanzania's regions.  
 A second finding is that in all cases, land conflicts "scale up" to institutions and 
arenas that are distinctly part of the formal state apparatus and the national polity.l 
Whereas neocustomary land tenure regimes work to "bottle up" of land dispute 
adjudication at the local level, under Tanzania's statist land regime, conflicts are often 
exported out of the local arena. Table II shows that in all jurisdictions, land cases travel 
up the formal hierarchy of village, ward, and district land courts.  In three of the cases, 
land conflict "scales up" into the national electoral arena. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Boundary disputes are common at the village and ward levels.  Ownership 
disputes dominate at the district level: Askew and Stein found that in 2004-2010, 57% of 
Babati tribunal land cases involved ownership disputes.li Court costs do represent a 
barrier to access for poor families, and they do give the wealthy a distinct advantage.lii  
Yet the data show that costs do not constitute a near-absolute barrier to access. Askew 
and Stein tracked steadily-rising caseloads at the Babati district tribunal, with the average 
annual caseload of 227 for 2006-2007 more than doubling to 508 in 2008/9.liii  These 
findings show that in spite of the costs, formal institutions do provide real channels of 
access to higher instances of the state apparatus.  
 
V. Non-conforming situations? 
 
Table II: Manyara Region Districts and Wards: In-Migration and Use of Land Tribunals 
cases and names  population  
 (2002, in 
'000s) 
n. of 
villages 
in- 
migration? 
village baraza ward tribunal district tribunal land conflict in 
electoral arena? n. 
cases 
years n. cases years n.cases years 
Babati District 
n. wards (2012):21 
303  
i. Kiru case Kiru (2011)*** 15.0 6 yes 60 2006-
9 
36 2006-12 10 2006-12             yes 
ii. Mamire case Mamire (2009) 19.5 6 yes   25 2007-9 5 2007-9  
Mamire (2012)* --     7 2012 1 2012  
iii. Riroda and 
Ayasanda 
Riroda  (2011)** 9.0 4 yes   "not 
functioning" 
  "some" yes 
Ayasanda 
(2011)** 
7.0 2 yes   "not 
functioning" 
2010-12 2 2010-2  
 Hanang District 
n. wards (2012):22 
205.1  
Farming wards:           
iv. Hanang, E. 
(Giting)  
     Giting (2009) 16.7 3 yes   64 2009, 
2011 
4 2009, 2011  
     Endasak (2009) 21.6 3 yes   30-40 2007-10 5 2007-10  
     Endaswold  4.8 3 yes   14 2011 1 2012  
v. Hanang, W. 
(Bassotu) 
Pastoral ward:           
     Bassotu (2009) 31 or 10.2 4 yes "none"  13 2010-13 1 2012 yes 
 Mbulu District 
n. wards (2012):16 
237.9  
vi. Mbulu 
 
 
Iraqw homeland 
wards: 
          
     Murray (2012) 8.3 4 no   60-80  "per 
year" 
9 Oct.2011- 
July 2012 
 
    Nambis (2011) 5.6 3 no >10  2012 46 2011-12 10 2011-2  
    Gehandu (2011) 11.5 4 no   ~10 2006-9 2 2006-9, 
2012 
 
Other Mbulu 
wards: 
          
      Haydom(2010) 23.7 6 yes "none"  24 2011-12 4 2011  
 
* Jan.-July 2012 only. ** ex Gorowa Native Authority jurisdictions.   ***at least 2 Kiru cases went to the High Court at Arusha in 2010-2. 
 There is no loud clamor of ethnic land claims in Manyara Region, despite high 
land pressure, the presence of in-migrants, and the existence of many multi-cultural 
communities. To further test and generalize this claim across other parts of Tanzania, we 
can look to the most visible possible exceptions to this rule.  These have to do with the 
land claims of pastoralists, and perhaps cases in which clan rights are invoked in land 
competition.liv 
 In Tanzania, pastoralists' land claims have at times been advanced as ethnic 
claims or ethnic rights to land, territory, and pasture. Well known examples are 
movements for Maasai or Barabaig rights.lv As in much of sub-Saharan Africa, there is a 
long history of Tanzanian government political, economic, and territorial marginalization 
of pastoralists.  Rie Odgaard explains that "large areas where they used to live have been 
alienated and turned into fields, plantations, national parks, etc."lvi Pastoralists in 
Tanzania have organized politically to resist dispossession, and although there is clearly 
an ethnic dimension to these mobilizations, the political effects of the statist land 
institutions are visible in at least two ways.  First, the claims to land and territory appear 
mostly as arguments for pastoralists' rights, rather than as ethnic claims per se.  Second, 
when these claims did appear as ethnic revendications, they were advanced as indigenous 
peoples' claims. Maasai activists rallied around the United Nations 2007 Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but as Hodgson explained in Being Maasai, Becoming 
Indigenous (2011), the indigenous discourse did not gain much traction in the Tanzanian 
context. Maasai groups eventually repositioned their land claims as livelihood claims.  
 The homeland claims of the Barabaig pastoralists of Hanang District (Hanang, 
west [Basotu], case v., above) also evince these patterns. Ethnic or descent-community 
claims are strongly present but not deployed overtly in political discourse.  In Basotu, 
there is strong land competition between Iraqw in-migrants in search of farmland and 
Barabaig pastoralists, and between Barabaig pastoralists and the state over the state-
owned NAFCO farms that cover the rump of their former territory on the eastern Hanang 
Plains.  This however finds it most overt political form as open struggle between 
pastoralists and the state over livelihood rights, rather than ethnic rights or autochthony 
claims.lvii  It has played out in the national-level institutions -- both electoral and judicial -
- as expected under statist property regime. 
 Some literature on land politics in Tanzania stresses the continuing vitality of clan 
rights in localized settings.  This research does not enfeeble our argument.  Clans or 
lineages can retain their social and political salience in the absence of the overarching 
institutions of neocustomary land tenure.  Salk Falk Moore argued that the clan was the 
smallest unit of the old ruling party, the Tanganika National Union, in the Chagga areas 
around Mount Kilimanjaro, for example. Her observation shows that clans can function 
as collectives that are nested within statist institutions.lviii  
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
 Even though land tenure institutions are arguably the most important state 
institutions in rural Africa, they have remained largely invisible in comparative political 
analysis.  The analysis here trains a spotlight on these poorly understood institutions, 
offering a typology of how they vary, framing hypotheses about the political effects of 
these variations, and probing hypotheses through the use of original data from a 
contrasting or counterfactual-type case.  The study spotlights the role of state authority 
and state-backed property institutions in projecting state power in rural Africa, and thus 
contrasts sharply with accounts of rural Africa as mostly ungoverned or uncaptured.lix 
And by theorizing structure, variation, and the effects thereof in African land tenure 
institutions, the research creates a bridge to studies of the political effects of direct and 
indirect rule institutions in other parts of the developing world.lx  
 Findings of this analysis challenge the tendency, common among political 
scientists and economists, to take ethnic identity as an independent variable in 
explanations of political outcomes in Africa. For many writers, ethnicity is pre-political 
source of individual preferences and values that actors bring to the table in their 
interactions with the state. The present study invert this views.  It adds new evidence to 
established literatures that show that neocustomary institutions produce ethnic identities 
through mechanisms embedded in everyday rules and practices of land administration. 
Under neocustomary institutions, the high economic and political salience of ethnic 
identities is an institutional effect.   
 A by-product of this study is a new answer to an enduring "puzzle" in studies of 
African politics:  the low salience of ethnicity in Tanzania, compared to ethnicity's high 
salience in Tanzania's neighbors -- Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zambia.  The 
low salience of political ethnicity in Tanzania is picked up in Afrobarometer survey data, 
and is stressed in diverse literatures focusing on both the national and local levels.lxi 
Scholarly discussion has been over how to account for the Tanzania anomaly, rather than 
whether it exists.  Existing work has pointed to a range of non-institutional causes:  low 
population density and high ethnic fragmentation, use of Swahili as a unifying national 
language, socialist ideologies and strong civic-education policies, the unifying force of 
President Julius Nyerere (1963-1990), and the existence of an "inclusive elite bargain" at 
the national level.  These explanations seem plausible yet underdetermining, given that 
similar factors have existed elsewhere without producing the same effects. 
 So far, the structure and character of state institutions -- including the statist 
character of Tanzania's land tenure institutions --  have not been featured in political 
science explanations of the anomaly of Tanzania's strong national identity.  Yet the 
"detribalization of rural power" that Mamdani identified as an effect of the abolition of 
neocustomary land tenure must have contributed to this outcome. Without the powerful 
effect of state-mandated ethnic entitlements to land that are the foundation of 
neocustomary land institutions, ethnic claims recede and other factors are foregrounded 
in land claim-making and land disputes.  In Tanzania, statist land institutions are working 
to structure settled communities' land claims as nationalist, legal, class-based and 
livelihood claims, or in terms of a race-centered ethnonationalism (black or African 
Tanzanians), rather than as ethnic claims.  Land tenure institutions appear to be playing a 
significant role in the on-going forging of national citizenship and nation-building. 
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